Workmen\u27s Compensation--An Injury Caused by the Mental Strain of Employment is Compensable in Oklahoma by Moody, John W.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 1 
1968 
Workmen's Compensation--An Injury Caused by the Mental Strain 
of Employment is Compensable in Oklahoma 
John W. Moody 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John W. Moody, Workmen's Compensation--An Injury Caused by the Mental Strain of Employment is 
Compensable in Oklahoma, 5 Tulsa L. J. 92 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss1/9 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-An Injury Caused by
the Mental Strain of Employment is Compensable
in Oklahoma.
[W]e should be just before we are generous.1
In the recent case of Bill Gover Ford Company v. Roniger,2
a heart attack caused by the mental strain of employment
was held to be a compensable accidental injury as contem-
plated by the Workmen's Compensation Act.3 In previous
decisions concerning heart attacks caused by employment-
related mental or emotional strain, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has not allowed compensation.4 Heart attacks were
not considered "accidental injuries" as contemplated by the
Act.5 The Roniger case raises the problem inherent in work-
men's compensation cases involving heart attacks. It centers
on the question of whether the heart attack was caused by
the employment or by a nonemployment hazard. The prob-
lem becomes more complex where the precipitating cause
depends upon the subjective mental strain of employment
rather than an objective physical act.
In the Roniger case, the claimant's duties consisted of
general clerical work and dealing with customers. Two weeks
prior to the alleged injury, the claimant was required to
assume additional duties which consisted of the daily post-
ing of accounts and the reproducing of statements at the
end of the month. While copying these statements, the
claimant suffered sharp pains in her chest, causing her to
be hospitalized for ten days. The diagnosis was that the
1 Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Orum, 366 P.2d 919, 921 (Okla. 1961)
(Halley, J., dissenting).
2 426 P.2d 701 (Okla. 1967).
3 OKLA. STAT. tit. 85 (1961).
4 Bossert v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 405 P.2d 14 (Okla.
1965); Ada Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Snead, 364 P.2d 696
(Okla. 1961).
5 OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 3 (7) (1961).
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claimant had suffered a heart attack. The claimant testified
that as a result of her increased duties, she experienced a
"strain, a different strain." The claimant's doctor testified as
a medical expert "that the 'stress and strain' claimant was
under was the 'precipitating factor' causing the heart attack."6
The petitioner's physician, however, testified "her disability
was 'not caused by any work she (claimant) was doing, or
any nervous or mental strain that she says is associated with
her work'."7
The court unanimously acknowledged the causative fac-
tor of employment-related mental strain and sustained the
award of the State Industrial Court as having been supported
by competent evidence. The court held:
That over exertion or strain causing the death or
disability of an employee is more mental than muscular
does not preclude an award of compensation, since the
term "exertion" or "strain" is not confined in its use to
muscular efforts, but means the act of putting some
power or faculty into vigorous action; a strong effort,
either of the body or the mind.8
In support of this decision, the court cited decisions by
jurisdictions which follow the "unusual strain" doctrine.9
However, Oklahoma had previously abandoned the "unusual
strain" doctrine. Proof that an unusual strain occurred was
no longer required to justify a compensatory award.o In
6 426 P.2d at 703.
7 Id.
8 426 P.2d at 702 (syllabus by the court).
9 Fink v. City of Paterson, 44 N.J.Super. 129, 129 A.2d 746
(Super. Ct. 1957); Lobman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19
App. Div. 2d 931, 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1963); Monahan v. Seeds
& Durham, 134 Pa. Super. 469, 3 A.2d 998, rev'd, 336 Pa. 67,
6 A.2d 889 (1939). See Larson, The "Heart Cases" In Work-
men's Compensation: An Analysis And Suggested Solution,
65 MICH. L. REV. 441, 445-48 (1967), for a detailed critique of
those jurisdictions following the "unusual strain" doctrine.
10 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Evans, 376 P.2d 336 (Okla. 1962);
Kelley v. Enid Terminal Elevators, 372 P.2d 589 (Okla. 1962).
19681
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 5 [1968], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss1/9
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
support of its holding, the court cited Monahan v. Seeds
and Durham.11 In that case, the deceased suffered a heart
attack after spending long hours searching for and worry-
ing about a mistake made in payroll figures. However, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Monahan case
and stated "the record convinces us that the evidence com-
pletely fails to support the conclusion that there was a casual
connection between the alleged over-exertion and his death."12
Even if one is to disregard the overruling of the Monahan
case, the reintroduction of the "unusual strain" doctrine con-
flicts considerably with prior decisions of the Oklahoma
courts. To comprehend fully the basis for the Roniger de-
cision, one must examine the underlying judicial develop-
ment of cases awarding compensation for heart attacks. The
development of case law concerning heart attacks has cen-
tered upon the understandable fear that abuse of the Work-
men's Compensation Act might occur if it were difficult to
determine whether the "accidental injury" was a result of
natural causes or a result of the employment.
In order to resolve the evidential problem of the causa-
tion of a heart attack, the courts first required that the cause
of an accidental injury be attended by a strain or an unusual
exertion.13 The effect of this was to place the accidental
quality upon the cause rather than the resulting injury. "To
say that it was accidental merely because it was unexpected
could be to authorize a judgment based upon conjecture,
surmise and speculation."14
The requirement that an accident precede an injury
was subsequently reviewed by the Oklahoma court in
11 134 Pa. Super. 469, 3 A.2d 998, rev'd, 336 Pa. 67, 6 A.2d 889
(1939).
12 336 Pa. at 67, 6 A.2d at 890.
13 See, e.g., Oklahoma Leader Co. v. Wells, 147 Okla. 294, 296
P. 751 (1931).
14 National Biscuit Co. v. Lout, 179 Okla. 259, 262-63, 65 P.2d
497, 502 (1937).
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Carden Mining and Milling Co. v. Yost.15 In this case the
claimant suffered a heart attack as the result of the stren-
uous effort required in climbing "chat" or "tailing" piles.
On the day when the heart attack occurred, he had been
required to make numerous trips to the top of the piles. The
court held this to be the precipitating cause of the heart
attack. Since the claimant climbed the chat piles as part
of his usual employment, the distinctive issue raised in this
case was the interpretation to be placed upon "accidental
injury." The Yost case held the question of whether there
was an "accident" was inapplicable and defined an accident
as " 'an event happening without human agency, or if hap-
pening through human agency, an event which, under the
circumstances, is unusual and not expected to the person to
whom it happens. In the term "accidental injury," the sub-
stantive "injuries" expresses the notion of a thing or event;
that is, the wrong or damage done to the person, while "acci-
dental" qualifies and describes the noun by ascribing to
"injuries" a quality or condition of happening, or coming by
chance or without design . . ' "16 Thus, one may define
an "accidental injury" as an unexpected result of employ-
ment. However, the Yost case still required proof of an un-
usual strain, even though the injury might occur in the
course of his usual employment.
Farmers Cooperative Association v. Madden17 was the
first important Oklahoma case to depart from the unusual
strain requirement. The Madden case held that the normal
strain of employment may be the precipitating cause of an
15 193 Okla. 423, 144 P.2d 969 (1943).
16 193 Okla. at 425, 144 P.2d at 972, quoting Andrews Mining &
Milling Co. v. Atkinson, 192 Okla. 322, 323-24, 135 P.2d 960,
961-62 (1943); accord Rigdon & Bruen Oil Co. v. Beerman,
346 P.2d 169 (Okla. 1959); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Kincannon, 203
Okla. 195, 218 P.2d 625 (1950).
17 356 P.2d 741 (Okla. 1960); accord, Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Orum,
366 P.2d 919 (Okla. 1961).
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accidental injury. The court sustained an award for the
claimant and rejected the petitioner's argument that an
award could not be made where there was no unusual or
unaccustomed physical activity by the claimant. The de-
cision set forth the evidentiary steps necessary to show proof
of an accidental injury from strain. That proof includes:
(a) lay testimony as to the nature of the labor performed
by the workmen when injured;
(b) expert opinion that the exertion attendant upon such
physical activity as shown was sufficient in degree to,
and did produce the strain which resulted in the work-
man's disability.18
H. J. Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham19 rejected the con-
tention that the claimant must show that an unusual strain
occurred in the course of his normal employment. The court
held the basis for compensation to be an injury accidental
in effect rather than an injury caused by an accident.
[Aln internal injury of a sudden, unusual and unex-
pected nature may nevertheless be accidental in char-
acter, although its external cause is attributable to
ordinary work performed in a normal manner and
without any untoward incident connected therewith.20
The court pointed out that:
... The impact of a strain develops from an inter-play
of a multitude of variable factors which depend largely
on the individual reaction of a given human organism
to the physical forces in action. Strain or overexertion
relates exclusively to the person injured. As applied
to that person, its principal ingredient is unusual effect
rather than unusual cause.21
18 356 P.2d at 744.
19 397 P.2d 637 (Okla. 1964).
20 Id. at 640.
21 Id. at 641.
[Vol. 5, No. I
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The court concluded:
• . . It was sufficient to show factually and medically
that there was a causal relation between the heart attack
and the sum total of claimant's antecedent efforts of
labor which for him must be deemed "unusual" or stress-
ful .... Whether a heart attack is provoked by em-
ployee's labor or is a result of natural causes is a question
of fact, and before recovery for a heart attack is allowed
it must be apparent to the rational mind, upon con-
sideration of all the circumstances, that there is a causal
connection between the labor and the resulting injury.22
The Oklahoma courts, therefore, allow recovery under the
Workmen's Compensation Act for a heart attack suffered by
an employee as a result of the normal strain of his employment.
Prior to the Roniger case, the Oklahoma courts had not
allowed recovery where the claim was based upon the alleged
mental or emotional strain as the precipitating, employment-
related cause of an accidental injury. It is difficult to deter-
mine, however, if this has been primarily a result of indecision,
whether mental strain, with its evidentiary problems, may
cause a heart attack; or if it was merely because the courts
were not presented with a satisfactory situation on which to
base such a decision. In Ada Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Snead,23
the claimant was not allowed to recover for a heart attack
caused by his worrying about his inability to work. The
claimant had ceased working due to an injury incurred three
years prior to the heart attack. The court gave an indication
that even in a more reasonable fact situation the result
might be the same. "No case has been called to our attention
in which worry was a factor; however, it would seem that such
is not a 'risk reasonably incident to the employment' .... "24
In Bossert v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Company,25 the claimant
22 Id. (emphasis added).
23 364 P.2d 696 (Okla. 1961).
24 Id. at 699.
25 405 P.2d 14 (Okla. 1965).
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had been treated for hypertension prior to the heart attack.
Thus, the Roniger case may have been the first case where
it was apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of
all the circumstances, that there was a causal connection
between the labor and the heart attack.
The Roniger case forms the basis for an award of com-
pensation where it can be shown that the employment caused
the mental strain, and that the mental or emotional strain
was in fact the precipitating cause of the heart attack. This
would be an acceptable criterion for granting an award.
The question raised by the Roniger case, however, is whether
the emotional or mental strain must be unusual. Previous
decisions by the Oklahoma Supreme Court have given a
sound basis for determining the causal connection between a
claimant's employment and an injury. The court in the
Roniger case should have relied upon its past decisions and
should not have referred to jurisdictions still following the
often criticized "unusual strain" doctrine.26 Oklahoma courts
have realized the fallibility of the unusual strain test in regard
to injuries caused by physical strain. There is no reason to
cause the same judicial problem over mental strain. The
rationale of the approach advocated is simple--"but for the
employment, the claimant would be unharmed." This ap-
proach assumes as its distinguishing factor whether the cause
of the injury arose from a personal basis unrelated to the
employment or arose from the demands of the employment
upon the individual. This approach would best implement
the liberal intent of the Workmen's Compensation Act; that
is, to provide for the human cost of production.
John W. Moody
26 For a critique on interpretations of "unusual strain" and
"accident" see, Larson, supra note 9, at 465-68.
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